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The Semi-Sovereign Corporation
Daniel J.H. Greenwood
Introduction
This essay is part of a larger project on the status of our public corporations in the great 
liberal public/private divide.  We have classified corporations as private – civil society, 
not government; entities that need to be protected from government, not government-like 
entities from which we need to be protected.  So, corporations have rights, for example, 
of speech and privacy, but we do not have a structure of fundamental rights against them. 
Classic liberal thought centered around the state: the state, after all, had a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force.  I don’t know if that was ever correct; the Pinkertons were an 
entirely private army of union busters.  But today we live in an age when the US army 
outsources torture in Iraqi prisons, where public social security systems may be 
dismantled, where health insurance depends on your job far more than on your 
citizenship, where executives at the right firms can work anywhere in the world, and the 
firms themselves are increasingly difficult to associate with a particular jurisdiction.  As 
the state diminishes and our largest economic entities expand, this dichotomy is 
increasingly dysfunctional, concealing potentially unjust power relations and distracting 
us from needed reform. 
Corporations are private, not state actors.  This is the only reason why it makes sense 
$ that we have speech and privacy rights against the government, but 
employers have an unquestioned automatic right to probe the contents of 
our desks and email accounts;
$ that we have freedom of information rights to a transparent government, 
but Microsoft has privacy rights that prevent us from knowing how it 
plans to change our lives;
$ that the City Assessor needs to have a reason and a process before raising 
my taxes, but my medical insurance is dependent solely on the whims 
and market power of my employer.   
The proper classification of public corporations as private, non-state actors is critical, as 
well,  to international law and particularly human rights law.  International law has long 
struggled with the issue of legal personality – which entities are recognized as actors in 
and subjects of international law.  Indeed, the British East India Company claimed 
aspects of sovereignty – the right to have its contracts treated as international treaties, the 
right to make war – even before it became clear that the Indian princedoms it was 
colonizing would be denied that status.  If our major corporations share many of the 
characteristics of sovereigns, they should share the responsibilities as well.  
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I.  Quasi-sovereigns: Worms in the entrayles of the state.
In the beginning, everyone understood that corporations were somewhat sovereign.  The 
ancient corporations – the Church, the Knights Templar and the Knights Hospitallers of 
St. John (which at various times from the First Crusade to the French Revolution 
controlled Jerusalem, Acre, Tripoli, Rhodes, and Malta as well as many fortresses 
elsewhere), the Universities, the City of London, later the British East India Company 
and the Massachusetts Bay Company  – were corporations precisely because they had the 
authority to make law for their members.  Right of clergy, the students’ right to be tried 
by the law of the University (and to carry their national student law with them even as 
they studied abroad), the City’s right to self-regulate were the essence of the beast.   
As Hobbes put it, each corporation was a threat to the state:
as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes 
in the entrayles of a naturall man.1
The early corporations did not distinguish clearly between business and politics.2
Between the beginning of the seventeenth century and the Revolution, France created 
seventy-five “ Colonization Companies,” with charters granting not only monopoly 
trading rights but also “political powers.”3  Similarly, while some of the American 
colonies are founded with land grants,4 others famously begin with charters creating 
“bodies corporate and politic”:
$ the Plymouth Council,5
! the Massachusetts Bay Company,6
! Connecticut7
1Hobbes, Leviathan.  “Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to 
furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which 
are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.”
2As late as 1801, there were only 8 manufacturing corporations in America.  R. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO CORPORATE LAW 6.  
3M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 92(1926).
4For land grants, see e.g., Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh, 1584; Charter of Carolina 1665.  These charters take the form of 
deeds of land to an owner.
5Charter of the Plymouth Council (1620).  Cf. William Bradford, &c. Surrender of the Patent of Plymouth Colony to the 
Freeman, March 2d, 1640 (original patentees transfer to the “Freemen of this Corporacon of New Plymouth all that ther 
right and title power authorytie priviledges immunities and freedomes graunted in the said Letters Patents”).
6
“And them by the name of the Governor and Company of the Mattachusetts Bay in Newe England, one bodie politique 
and corporate in deede, fact, and name, Wee doe for vs, our heires and successors, make, ordeyne, constitute, and confrime 
by theis presents, and that by that name they shall have perpetuall succession: And that by the same name they and their 
successor shall, and maie be capeable and enabled, as well to implead and be impleaded, and to prosecute, demaund, and 
aunswere, and be anusnweared vnto, in all and singuler suites, causes, quarrells and acctions of what kinde or nature 
soever...”  Charter of the Colony of The Massachusetts Bay in New England [1628], reprinted in 1 Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, 
Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 10 (1853 reprinted 1968).
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! The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London, 
for the first Colony in Virginia,8
! The Hudson Bay Company (in Canada).9
The original charters for both the London Company (to settle Virginia) and the Plymouth 
Company (to settle New England) made these companies more state-like than our states:  
they each gave the respective company the right to control immigration, issue coins, 
fortify and defend the territory and impose customs duties10–rights of sovereignty that the 
states gave up no later than 1789.  But these seem to have been less extraordinary 
derogations of the King’s authority than simple consequences of the basic 
conceptualization of the new colonies as manors and business corporations as sharing 
characteristics with that other corporate estate, the aristocracy.
The same phrase is used in 
the Charter of Dartmouth College,11
7
“we have thought fit, and at the humble Petition of the Persons aforesaid, and are graciously Pleased to create and make 
them a Body Politicly and Corporate, with the Powers and Privileges herein after mentioned; and accordingly Our Will and 
Pleasure is, and of our especial Grace, certain Knowledge, and meer Motion, We have ordained, constituted and declared, 
and by these presents, for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, Do ordain, constitute and declare, that they the said John 
Winthrop, John Mason, Samuel Wyllys, Henry Clarke, Matthew Allyn, John Tapping, Nathan Gold, Richard Treat, 
Richard lord, Henry Wolcott, John Talcott, Daniel Clarke, John Ogden, Thomas Wells, Obadiah Bowed, John Clerke, 
Anthony Hawkins, John Deming, and Matthew Camfeild, and all such others as now are, or hereafter shall be admitted and 
made free of the Company and Society of Our Colony of Connecticut, in America, shall from Time to Time, and for ever 
hereafter, be One Body Corporate and politique, in Fact and Name, by the Name of, Governor and Company of the English 
colony of Connecticut in New-England, in America;
“And that by the same Name they and their Successors shall and may have perpetual Succession, and shall and may be 
Persons able and capable in the Law, to plead and be impleaded, to answer and to be answered unto, to defend and be 
defended in all and singular Suits, Causes, Quarrels, Matters, Actions, and Things, of what Kind or Nature soever; and also 
to have, take, possess, acquire, and purchase Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, or any Goods or Chattels, and the same 
to lease, grant, demise, alien, bargain, sell, and dispose of, as other Our liege People of this Our Realm of England, or any 
other Corporation or Body Politique within the same may lawfully do. And further, That the said Governor and Company, 
and their Successors shall and may forever hereafter have a common Seal, to serve and use for all Causes, Matters, Things, 
and affairs whatsoever, of them and their Successors, and the same Seal, to alter, change, break and make new from Time 
to Time, at their Wills and Pleasures, as they shall think fit.”  Charter of Connecticut 1662.
8See, JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 32 (1917) (“This company was 
frankly a business corporation... organized on the model of the East India Company.”)
9LINDLEY, supra n.  at 95-6 states that the 1670 Hudson Bay Company charter explicitly granted it “legislative and judicial 
powers over all the inhabitants of the lands ceded it” as well as the right to have an army and a navy, make war and peace, 
and so on, all under the sovereignty of the King “as of our Manor of East Greenwich in our county of Kent in free and 
common Soccage.”  The Company sold its territories to the Crown in 1869.  
10LINDLEY, supra n.  at 93.
11
 And the trustees of said college may and shall be one body corporate and politic, in deed, action and name, and shall 
be called, named and distinguished by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College.
And further, we have willed, given, granted, constituted and ordained, and by this our present charter, of our special grace, 
certain knowledge and mere motion, with the advice aforesaid, do, for us, our heirs and successors forever, will, give, 
grant, constitute and ordain that there shall be in the said Dartmouth College, from henceforth and forever, a body politic 
consisting of trustees of said Dartmouth College. ...
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the Incorporation of Harvard College12 (1650), and 
in the charter of the College of William and Mary (1693)13: 
each is created a “body politic and corporate.”14
And we do further, of our special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, for us, our heirs and successors, will, give, 
grant and appoint that the said trustees and their successors shall forever hereafter be, in deed, act and name, a body 
corporate and politic, and that they, the said body corporate and politic, shall be known and distinguished, in all deeds, 
grants, bargains, sales, writings, evidences or otherwise howsoever, and in all courts forever hereafter, plea and be 
impleaded by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College; and that the said corporation, by the name aforesaid, shall 
be able, and in law capable, for the use of said Dartmouth College, to have, get, acquire, purchase, receive, hold, possess 
and enjoy, tenements, hereditaments, jurisdictions and franchises, for themselves and their successors, in fee-simple, or 
otherwise howsoever, and to purchase, receive or build any house or houses, or any other buildings, as they shall think 
needful and convenient, for the use of said Dartmouth College, ... and also to receive and dispose of any lands, goods, 
chattels and other things, of what nature soever, for the use aforesaid; and also to have, accept and receive any rents, 
profits, annuities, gifts, legacies, donations or bequests of any kind whatsoever, for the use aforesaid; so, nevertheless that 
the yearly value of the premises do not exceed the sum of 6000 sterling; and therewith, or otherwise, to support and pay, 
as the said trustees, or the major part of such of them as are regularly convened for the purpose, shall agree, the president, 
tutors and other officers and ministers of said Dartmouth College; and also to pay all such missionaries and schoolmasters 
as shall be authorized, appointed and employed by them, for civilizing and christianizing, and instructing the Indian natives 
of this land, their several allowances; and also their respective annual salaries ...  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 524-6 (1819).
123 Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 195 (1853 
reprinted 1968).  The articles create a corporation consisting of the President, five fellows and a treasurer, and declare that 
“said president & fellowes, for the time being, shall for euer hereafter in name & fact be one body polliticke & corporate  
in law, to all intents & purposes, and shall haue ppetuall succession, & shalbe called by the name of President & Fellowes 
of Harvard Colledge... and by that name they ... may purchase & acquire to themselves...” [1650].  The 1672 charter 
repeats the “body pollitick & corporate in lawe” language, if with slightly different spelling.  Id., vol 4, pt 2, p 536.
13See, http://www.swem.wm.edu/spcoll/exhibits/exhibits/charter/charter/ (text of charter) at para V. Cf.  Para IX:
“And we give and grant to them, or the major part of them, by these our letters patents, a continual succession, to be 
continued in the way and manner hereafter specified; as also full and absolute liberty, power and authority, of making, 
enacting, framing and establishing such and so many rules, laws, statutes, orders and injunctions, for the good and 
wholesome government of the said college, as to them the said Francis Nicholson, William Cole, &c., and their successors, 
shall from time to time, according to their various occasions and circumstances, seem most fit and expedient: All which 
rules, laws, statutes and injunctions so to be made, as aforesaid, we will have to be observed, under the penalty therein 
contained: Provided notwithstanding that the said rules, laws, statutes, orders and injunctions, be no way contrary to our 
prerogative royal, nor to the laws and statutes of our kingdom of England or our colony of Virginia, aforesaid, or to the 
canons and constitutions of the church of England, by law established.”
14Other early corporations lack that phrase but have an equivalent understanding of what it is to be a corporation.  In 1648, 
the General Court of Massachusetts Bay authorized the “shewmakers” and the “cowpers” (coopers) to incorporate for 3 
years, to control quality.  The two grants are almost word for word identical. The assembled shoemakers or coopers and 
their elected officers “shall have the power to make orders for the well ordering of their company, in the managing of their 
trade, & all the affaires thereunto belonging,& to annex reasonable poenantyes for breach of the same; [the orders to be 
confirmed by a county court]... And for the better executing of such orders, the said [officers] shall have power to heare & 
determine all offences agasint any of their said orders, & may inflict the poenalties prescribed as aforesaid ... and all the 
said fines & forfeitures shall be implied to the benefit of the said company of cowpers ...”  2  Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, 
Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England 249-51(1853 reprinted 1968)
Somewhat less clearly, in 1652, the same Court created the Conduite Streete (Boston) Water Works 
Corporation in these terms: “sajd inhabitants above mentioned shallbe a corporation, and incorporated into one body or 
company ... [call annual meeting, elect officers, hire and perform work,] and that it shall be laufull for the sajd wardens for 
the tjme being to distrajne the goods of any person or persons, refjusing to pay his due proportjon,... [and if anyone 
“spoyling” the water, the wardens are authorized] to impleade such persons for and in the name of the whole company... 
and for such as shall take water there wthout license, it shallbe lawfull for the wardens for the tjme being, or whom they 
shall appointe, after warning given them, to take away and withhold such vessells from them as they shall bring to carry 
away such water with...” id. Vol 4, p. 100.  Note that the wardens are given the unilateral right to enforce some Company 
rules against both insiders and outsiders apparently without going to state authorities (but with respect to “corrupting” or 
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Indeed, I think it is fair to say that those words are the operative language, the way that 
courts determined, before the general incorporation acts, whether a corporation had been 
formed.15
Conversely, even obviously non-political charters, such as Dartmouth College’s 
explicitly provide for “law making”, much the same as a municipality would:  
& they are hereby fully impowered from time to time fully & lawfully to make 
and establish such Ordinances Orders & Laws as may tend to the good & 
wholesome government of the said College & all the Students & the several 
Officers & Ministers thereof & to the publick benefit of the same not repugnant 
to the  & Statutes of our Realm of GREAT BRITAIN or of this our Province of 
NEW HAMPSHIRE (emph. supplied)16
In 1793, the early British corporations treatise author Kyd defines the corporation as 
a “body politic” or  a “political person” created “for the maintenance and regulation of 
some particular object of public policy.”17
These are just the terms we saw in the charters themselves.  
A century later, the metaphor remained strong.  Angel and Ames, mid-century, similarly 
refer to the power to make by-laws as “legislative”
considered as private statutes for the governance of the corporate body.18
Other courts refer to it as 
stemming from a limited legislative power
or a power of qualified legislation19
“spoyling” the water, they appear to be required to go to court, perhaps because the issue is likely to more difficult.  The 
Shoemakers and Coopers corporations were also required to refer “cases of difficulty” to the “judges of the county.”  
15See, JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 23 (1917)
16Harvard’s charter similarly authorizes “the president & fellowes, or major part of them, ... to make from time to time such 
orders and by lawes for the better ordring & cariing on the worke of the colledge as they shall thinke fitt; provided they, the 
said orders, be allowed by the overseers.”  Id.  (The requirement of prior approval by the overseers was removed in 1657, 
Vol 4 at 316.)   The 1672 charter refers not to bylaws, but “orders and lawes”.  Id. Vol 4, pt 2, at 536.    
Nonetheless, Harvard’s original powers were somewhat less than those traditionally given to universities, since 
it required another act of the Massachusetts general court to declare that “the president & fellowes of Harvard Colledge... 
are hereby empowred, accordinge to their best discretion, to punish all misdemenors of the youth in their societie, either by 
fine or whippinge in the hall, openly, as the nature of the offense shall require, not exceedinge ten shillinges or ten stripes 
for one offense”.  Id at Vol 3 at 417 [1656].  In the 1672 charter, the Corporation’s power to punish is expanded yet again: 
“the sajd corporation, or any three of them ... in all crimes by the lawes of this country punishable by one magistrate, shall 
haue the ffull power of sconsing, fineing, or otherwise correcting all inferiour officers or members to the sajd society 
belonging, as the lawes of the country provide in such cases, or the lawes of the colledge not repugnant vnto them; and 
for that end any of the sajd corporation shall and heereby haue power personally, with such ayde of the society as 
they shall think meete, taking the constable along with them, to enter into any houses licensed for publicke 
enterteynment where tehy shall be informed, or may be suspitious, of any enormitjes to be plotting or acting by any 
members of their society...”. 
171 STEWARD KYD, A TREATISE ON CORPORATIONS 13, 14, 28 (1793, facsimile edition 1978).  
18JOSEPH ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 2d Edition (1843) at  
65, 267, 271 
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The best example, perhaps, is the British East India Company.  Organized as a for profit 
corporation paying dividends to its shareholders, earned its profits by trade, and later, tax 
revenues from India and the tea and opium trade with China.  It early on claimed the right 
to build forts and cities, to make peace and war, enter into treaties and govern–all 
independent of Parliament (as its charter stemmed from the Crown) and on equal terms 
with the non-European governments (and rival European trading companies).20
Listen to its attorneys in the case of Nabob of Arcot v. East India Company.21  The case 
stemmed from a demand by the Nabob for an accounting of his revenues which, 
according to the case report, he had assigned to the Company for a period of time in 
payment of some debts.  He contended that the Company had taken more than it was 
entitled to.   Burke has a far more complicated explanation of what was happening. This 
is part of the argument for the Company:
A bill on this subject cannot be entertained by this court; transactions between 
sovereign princes... cannot be liable to any municipal jurisdiction.  No law can 
apply between them, but the law of nations.  These are such transactions: for, by 
the charters and acts of parliament, the East India Company are constituted a 
sovereign power, or at least are the delegates of the sovereign power of this 
country, for the purposes of making peace and war. ... Can the Court enjoin a 
war between the parties?  Your Lordship will not entertain a suit that cannot be 
executed by common means. ... [T]he East India Company are prevented from 
giving this discovery.  They are under the absolute authority of the Board of 
Controul, and cannot act but under their direction.  Suppose their orders and 
those of the Court should be contradictory, what a situation the Company would 
be in!
The argument is ambivalent regarding whether the Company is itself a sovereign or 
rather a delegate of the sovereign of England, reflecting the effects of Pitt’s India Act of 
1785, which put the Company under the control of a quango-style “superintending” board 
including governmental officials for the first time.22  After 185 years as a private, profit-
maximizing, monopolistic, corporation, Parliament had determined to make it a regulated 
industry.  
19Tuttle v. Walton, 1 Ga. 43 (1849), at *2 (argument of counsel) and *8 (opinion of court).
20The East India Company obtained the right to make war in 1661 and 1683, the right to coin money in 1677, conquered 
Bengal in 1757 and after 1765 directly controlled the taxation of Bengal, Behar and Orissa as a nominal subordinate of the 
Moghul Emperor.  From 1767, the charters also expressly note that the Company exercised these seemingly sovereign 
powers “for the Crown.”  Lindley, supra n.  at  94-5.
21Nabob of Arcot v. East India Company, 3 Bro. C.C. 292 [1791], discussed in Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 37 (1999).  Burke has an 
elaborate discussion of the origins of the debt, which he sees as part of the deep corruption of the Company.  
22JOHN KEAY, THE HONOURABLE COMPANY 390-1  (1991).
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Those who know more about the history of the East India Company than I will no doubt 
be able to tell you that that ambivalence was a key part of its history.  But even at this late 
date, it is crystal clear on the key points: The Company makes its own rules, using its 
own internal mechanisms, and no one outside – not even a British court – is entitled to 
restrain it (except by the law of nations, here meaning mainly force of arms).  Only the 
Board of Controul, not a court, may tell it how to behave.  
To be sure, the other side contests that the East India Co is a sovereign state, on the 
ground that its existence depends on an act of Parliament, but then refers to Lord 
Baltimore as a “dependent sovereign” (referring to a case at 1 Vesey 444).  In reply, the 
Company makes the ambiguity more explicit:  
They do not refer to the mixed nature of the Company, which though, here, 
considered as a trading Company, is, there, in the character of a sovereign 
power. ... no instance is produced of one sovereign power bringing an action 
against another sovereign power.
The international lawyers understood the ambivalent position of the great trading 
corporations.  A British treatise from 1902 considers them sufficiently sovereign to be 
subjects of international law, largely because of their treaty making power.23  Nor was the 
British East India Company unusual.  In the early period, the colonizing corporation was 
typical–as noted above, France chartered 75 colonizing corporations prior to the 
Revolution, but there were roughly 8 business corporations, using a modern 
classification, in America during that period.  Nor was the trading corporation officially 
governing a brief moment in corporate history.  The British South Africa Company did 
not turn over its most explicitly governmental functions until 1923; the British North 
Borneo Company, formed in 1881 to be a sort of vassal state nominally under the Sultan 
of Borneo, continued under its original charter even later.24
The issue of the competence of municipal courts to resolve issues involving corporations 
remained controversial through the nineteenth century.  In 1843, Angell and Ames devote 
six pages to establishing the apparently controversial position that a foreign corporation 
may be sued if jurisdiction can be obtained by seizing its property.25  It was only by an 
1849 act of the legislature that New York determined that a foreign corporation could 
even be sued at all in its courts – corporations looked to the courts too much like the 
sovereigns that created them.26
23HANNIS TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW §222 (1902).
24LINDLEY, supra n. at100, 103, 106.
25ANGELL & AMES 336-342.  Cf.  Howell v. Chicago & N.W., 51 Barb. 378 (N.Y. Sup. 1868) (“Previous to the Code 
[noted in next footnote], foreign corporations were not the subject of litigation in the courts of this state, except when 
proceeded against by the attachment of their property for the collection of a debt or the redress of a wrong...”).  
26NYBCL 1314, derived from a 1920 amendment to the Gen. Corp. Law in turn derived from Code Civ. Proc 1780, 
enacted in 1849 and amended in 1880.  The original text appears in NY Law 1849, ch. 107 (authorizing suits “against any 
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Even after the statutory innovation, courts worried whether exercising jurisdiction over a 
corporation created by another state for “visitation” – that is to “examine into the affairs 
of a corporation”27 –  might be an infringement of comity, an invasion of the respect due 
to a fellow sovereign, and beyond the domestic court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
As a 1904 New York court put it:
If the illegal acts of the directors of the corporation offended solely 
against the majesty of the state to which it owed its life–in other words, 
constituted only public wrongs–the proposition is probably correct, for we are 
not compelled to, nor should we, entertain actions simply to redress the outraged 
dignity of foreign governments.28
But I am not concerned here with the niceties of jurisdiction, but rather with a way of 
thinking about the corporation.  
Here is the 8th Circuit in 1893 justifying what today would be called the business 
judgment rule:
Corporations are in a certain sense legislative bodies.  They have a legislative 
power when the directors or shareholders are duly convened that is fully 
adequate to settle all questions affecting their business interests or policy, and 
they should be left to dispose of all questions of that nature without applying to 
the courts for relief.29
***
The notion that a corporation was a mini-state was once as commonplace as Hobbes’ 
metaphor of the state as an artificial person, a body-corporate, remains today.  Indeed, 
Hobbes himself, for all his emphasis on the unlimited power of the single sovereign in his 
system, notes that subordinate “bodies politique” are quite common and that they have 
the power to make law over their subjects –
And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of 
a Province, or a Colony, is applicable also to an Assembly for the Government 
corporations created by or under the laws of any other state, government or country, for the recovery of any debt or 
damages”).  
27State ex rel Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co of Delaware, 2 N. W. 2d 372, 388, 395 (Iowa 1942) (exercising 
jurisdiction over and applying Iowa law to Delaware corporation).
28Miller v. Quincy ,72 N.E. 116, 118 (N.Y. 1904).
29Republican Mountain Silver Mines v Brown, 58 F. 644 (8th Cir 1893).   
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of a Town, or University, or a College, or a Church, or for any other 
Government over the persons of men.30
II.  Death of Self-Government
30He goes on the describe business corporations, which he views only as trading monopolies, in the following terms:
Bodies Politique For Ordering Of Trade
In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique,the most commodious 
Representative is an Assembly of all the members;that is to say, such a one, as every one that 
adventureth his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they 
will themselves.  For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, 
and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe 
neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. 
It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise  they buy at home, can fraight a Ship, to 
export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in 
one Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his 
adventure; or take his own; and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit.  
But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any 
other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects.  
The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole 
buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be 
a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole 
buyers; another to be sole sellers.  For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular 
forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying 
at home, and sole selling abroad.  For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: 
both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower,  and sell abroad 
at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels 
them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers. 
Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. 
...
If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative 
Assembly, every Member is lyable by himself for the whole.  For a stranger can take no notice of 
their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole
payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the 
Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot therefore demand his debt, but 
only from the common stock, if there be any. 
If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is understood to be layd upon every member 
proportionably to his particular adventure in the Company.  For there is in this case no other 
common stock,  but what is made of their particular adventures.
If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act 
was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime 
but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was  ordeyned by the authority of the 
Common-wealth,) is not his.  If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may be sued by the 
Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but 
only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by 
their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their 
own Cause.
©Daniel JH Greenwood 2005
Draft - Do Not Reproduce Without Permission
10
This way of thinking – the corporation as a mini-state, either delegated from the supreme 
sovereign or coexisting with it in a semi-feudal or Federal balance of powers – has 
disappeared from the academic discussion of corporations and almost as completely from 
the cases.  Modern metaphors overwhelmingly emphasize the private nature of the 
corporation: it is governed not by legislation but agency–fiat tempered by the right to 
quit.  Its purposes and actions are private, not public.  When it regulates its employees, 
the regulation is pursuant to contract and protected from, not by, the Constitution .
The ideological function of this shift in metaphor is clear: it solves, or at least elides,  a 
major problem in the democratic legitimacy of the corporation.  
As a self-governing entity the corporation was a sort of cross between herren-democracy 
and straight out plutocracy.  Only a small part of the relevant electorate was given the 
vote: shareholders but not bondholders, investors of money but not investors of time or 
effort, publicly traded shares with easy exit (at least individually) but not employees with 
genuine commitments, potentially exploitable  or locked in investors called shareholders, 
but not equally or more exploitable investors in roles such as bondholders, long term 
employees, pension beneficiaries, customers or suppliers.   We have no theory justifying 
restricting the vote only to shareholders, and in a generally democratic age, that is a 
problem in a political forum. 
Moreover, even within the voting population, votes are given not per person but per 
dollar – as if the members were not the shareholders but the shares themselves – and the 
issues on which voters may opine are sharply restricted.   
Indeed, the basic corporate law principle that the directors, not the shareholders, manage 
the company, is generally understood to require that directors exercise their mandate in 
the manner of Burke’s stateman: in the interest but not according to the will of the 
citizenry (with all the ambiguity inherent in determining who should be considered a 
citizen of the corporation or the pre-democratic British empire). 
All of this makes the corporation as polity pretty indefensible.  Were we to return to 
metaphors of the corporation as state, the state it would bring to mind would be Saudi 
Arabia, or perhaps Eastern Europe under the communists or the Former Soviet Union 
under the kleptocrats.  If this is a government, it is one that treats most of its subjects as 
helots to be exploited, not part of the common good.  Its pretenses to consent are at best 
Lockean “tacit consent”, with all the usual limitations to that argument, and specifically, 
lock-in.  Employees with firm specific investments in skills, relationships, family 
location, insurance or seniority, retirees with firm specific pensions or medical care, 
suppliers or customers in bilateral monopolies or otherwise tied to the particular firm – all 
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these persons in relationship with the firm have only limited “exit” options and their 
“tacit consent” is similarly atrophied.
III.  Corporation as Semi-Sovereign
But the demise of the public metaphor does not mean that the underlying insights of the 
older view are less true.  On the contrary, our public corporations are more state-like than 
ever.  
Hannah Arendt famously criticized the rights of man by pointing out that when as soon as 
men and women were stripped of their rights as citizens and members of a national 
people – they turned out to have no rights at all.  The rights of men were meaningful only 
as rights of citizens.  The 
“eternal Rights of Man, which by themselves were supposed to be independent 
of citizenship and nationality ...proved to be unenforeable ... whenever epole 
appeared who were no long citizens of any sovereign state.”31
The stateless, she said, have 
“no place which makes opinions effective and actions significant.”32
“Whoever is no longer caught in it [the system of citizenship] finds himself out 
of legality altogether (thus during the last war stateless people were invariable in 
a worse position than enemy aliens).  (Id. 174)
In the 50 years since Arendt wrote, human rights law has made some progress in puting 
some meaning into human rights for naked humans without sovereign protectors, and 
occasionally, although all too often to late, have put some teeth into “never again.”  
Still, Arendt’s claim that the victims all wanted national states, not the Rights of Man, 
remains as true today as ever.  And her claim that statelessness is worse than mere enemy 
status must ring true to the Guantanamo prisoners denied even the protection of the 
Geneva Convention on the grounds that they are not state actors.
But the current status of the stateless is well outside my core area here.
I want to suggest, rather, that thinking of corporations as quasi-sovereign – to some 
degree taking on aspects of the states that create them, and to some degree as independent 
states or at least sub-state governmental entities themselves – helps frame a series of 
issues.    
31HANNAH ARENDT,  IMPERIALISM 173
32HANNAH ARENDT, IMPERIALISM (1951, 1968) 176.
©Daniel JH Greenwood 2005
Draft - Do Not Reproduce Without Permission
12
Arendt suggests the first: whether corporate affiliation isn’t today approaching the 
importance of national affiliation.  
! It is my job, not my passport, that gives me basic social security rights, 
including access to medical care, pension benefits, and for you even 
schools.  
! It’s the right corporate affiliation, not the right passport, that allows you 
to work in the country you prefer.
! Corporate positions even allow people to bring some of their law with 
them, like the medieval university students – drinking in Saudi Arabia, 
for example, or taxation in the US
! Even for the classic liberal rights: my freedom to speak is made 
meaningful by my corporate affiliation; independent scholars are perhaps 
not as badly off as the stateless, but still, neither libraries nor westlaw nor 
even serious reads of submissions to the journals are readily available 
without the correct institutional backing.
One could multiply examples.  The proposition that large private institutions have taken 
over many functions of the unified state, in a revised return to the feudal notion of 
multiple estates, is not likely to be controversial.  
More controversial might be the extent to which these are privileges of affiliation with 
large institutions, as opposed to specifically publicly traded business corporations–after 
all Bechtel, large law partnerships and major universities provide these privileges as well 
as the exchange-traded firms.33  Business corporations remain our preeminent large 
corporations, so focus on them would be warranted even if other institutions posed 
essentially similar risks.  But more to the point, the peculiar governance of business 
corporations in fact makes them somewhat different than other large institutions: alone of 
all our governance structures they are directed to slavishly follow the market regardless 
of whether its directives make sense.  They alone function as agents for a legal construct, 
with no internal moderating principle or countervailing force.  Thus, as power is 
devolved to these institutions, publicly traded corporations should cause us special worry.  
They distinctively lack the restraints and balances that mark intelligent government.  
Let me nod towards a few other implications that must be held for future discussion. 
A.  Shareholders as Human Rights beneficiaries.
One of the more interesting aspects of the corporate metaphor is the ambiguity regarding 
the corporation’s borders and subjects.  In this essay, I’ve mostly assumed that the 
corporation primarily effects its employees and that they are, therefore, the closest 
analogy to the subjects of a state.  But corporate law often ignores employees, acting as if 
33Thanks to Neil Cohen for urging me focus on this.
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the investors, or at least the equity investors, were the key constituency of the firm.  
Corporate “democracy” as it is usually discussed in the literature refers not to human 
control over corporations seen as quasi-governments, but rather to the system of voting 
proportional to dollar investment in equity that is formally the ultimate control 
mechanism over our corporations.  Whatever that is, it isn’t democracy.  
But considering the shares as corporate subjects does raise some interesting issues.
If we consider the shareholder role as a different rough analogue to citizens in the quasi-
sovereign corporation – we see that shares have a far more effective international rights 
regime than we’ve managed to create for real people.
And one that doesn’t depend on nationality in the classic sense at all.  
First, shareholders, or more properly the role of shareholding (not the full people who 
invest) have achieved the stateless Rights of Man that Arendt saw as unenforceable and 
empty.  
Shares, regardless of citizenship or locale of their ultimate human owners or beneficiaries 
(usually indirect) do have effective legal protection of their rights inside the corporation.  
Without exaggerating the degree to which shares control the firm, the fact remains that 
corporations are generally run in their interest – and, most relevantly for the nationality 
point, shares held by foreigners (and even non-human institutions) are normally treated 
indistinguishably from those held by Americans.    
Moreover corporate law and the stock market makes real the right to exit in a way that 
the refugees have never had.  Arendt emphasizes that even the right to emigrate, when it 
existed, wasn’t worth much without a commensurate right to immigrae.  In the world of 
share-citizenry, the situation is quite different.  Not only may investors sell the stock of a 
company that mistreats them, but they are free to buy the stock of other companies.  
Stock investors need not remain stateless, unaffiliated with any corporation, unprotected 
by any system of internal lawmaking.  
The shares traded in the New York Stock Exchange are owned in large part by 
institutions.  Pushing through the institutions to find the human ultimate beneficiaries is 
difficult, and sometimes conceptually unclear (who are the human beneficiaries of a 
University endowment?) .  But many estimates suggest (as the macro numbers do as 
well) that a large and growing portion of the investment is foreign, or, more interesting 
still, of hidden formal citizenship.  
B.  Corporations as Actors
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The same, of course, is true of our corporations themselves.  They too have rights today 
that are effectively protected without regard to nationality.  
Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to intelligibly assign nationality to the largest 
corporations.  Is Chrysler German or American?  What would be the relevant test?  
Should those of us who long boycotted VW now add PT Cruisers to the list?   
With hitherto unimaginable economic power and often physical power to match,
corporations are independent players to a far greater extent than most of the members of 
the United Nations.  To be sure they act under constraints, but less so than most.  
They are not subordinate governmental units – if indeed they even have nationality.  
Indeed have protection from their own and other governments, protection against 
ombudsmen, against political decisions to reallocate the social resources they control, 
protections against investigations into how they operate their internal affairs, protections 
against demands that they serve the interests of those they exploit.  
C.   Corporations as Nation States.
As we’ve seen, corporate employment now offers many of the advantages once 
associated with Arendt’s passport.  
Travel as an executive of a major multinational and you bring with you an international 
regime of protection stronger, in many respects, than the national one that comes with 
your passport.  American executives in trouble spots can expect security forces in their 
defense, quick evacuation, medical care not available to the locals, even exemption from 
petty local rules such as Saudi Arabian bans on liquor or sexual discrimination.  Try that 
as a tourist.
Passports themselves are readily available to those with the right corporate connections.
I myself worked comfortably in London for six months as a representative of my 
employer, something simply unavailable to me as a naked bearer of the Rights of Man or 
even the rights of Americans.
More prosaically, even for those not in the elite, and particularly for Americans.  Our 
health, our ability to pay our mortgages and our credit cards, our pensions, all depend on 
our corporate affiliation.  90% of bankruptcies are related to lost jobs, often from lost 
health.
Conversely, violations of our human rights are at least as likely from the corporations we 
work for as from our states.  Corporations can dismiss us without a hearing; the state 
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cannot.  Corporations can search our desks without explanation or warning, or read our 
mail, or even prevent us from using our computers.  As suppliers rather than employers, it 
is corporations, not our governments, that have decided that it is permissible to clog our 
computers with cookies.  
Need I go on?   If I could choose between being a lifetime employee of a major world 
corporation and having a passport, it seems clear to me that taking corporate protection 
would be more worthwhile.  And if I had the choice of having protection against the City 
of Salt Lake’s possible future depredations and those of my health insurance company, 
I’d much prefer rights against the latter.  In the last election, many of our states banned 
gay marriage.  But the effects on real people’s real lives will be far greater if many of our 
major corporations decide to continue to give benefits.   
Isn’t it time we began to see our largest and most powerful bureaucratic actors as the 
public entities they are?    
